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1 
KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT, PA: HOW A 
GRAVEYARD DISPUTE RESURRECTED THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT’S TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Brian T. Hodges* 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township 
of Scott, Pa., holds that a “property owner has suffered a violation of his 
Fifth Amendment rights when the government takes his property without 
just compensation, and therefore may bring his claim in federal court 
under [42 U.S.C.] §1983 at that time” without regard to the availability 
of state remedies.  At first glance, this decision appears to be a modest 
ruling on ripeness.  But in truth, Knick marks a significant development 
in takings law.  Indeed, to reach the ripeness question, Knick concluded 
that its earlier decision, Williamson County Regional Planning Commis-
sion v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, had “rest[ed] on a mistaken view 
of the Fifth Amendment” and therefore Knick adopts a very different ap-
proach to the Takings Clause.  This Note discusses the state of takings 
law both before, during, and after the demise of Williamson County’s 
state litigation ripeness requirement.  By doing so, the Note provides 
context that will highlight the Court’s changed interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment and what that change might mean for future takings liti-
gants.  The Note concludes that Knick will have a significant impact on 









 * Brian T. Hodges is a senior attorney with Pacific Legal Foundation and was part of 
the litigation team representing Rose Mary Knick before the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case, Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 *2019). J.D., Seattle 
University School of Law, 2001; M.A., University of Washington, 1998; B.A., University of 
Washington, 1996. 
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“Let’s talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs”1 
“It’s fitting that a dispute over an alleged cemetery would resurrect 
a long-buried constitutional right.”2 
“Cemeteries used to be nice and quiet. Now they’re teeming with 
life.”3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Decided on June 21, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa.,4 holds that a “property owner has suf-
fered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights when the government 
takes his property without just compensation, and therefore may bring 
 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF KING RICHARD THE SECOND act 
3, sc. 2. 
 2. Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Ends “Catch-22” That Blocked Property Owners from 
Suing the Government, FORBES (June 22, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nick-
sibilla/2019/06/22/supreme-court-ends-catch-22-that-blocked-property-owners-from-suing-
the-government/#a98646b3687f. 
 3. ANTHONY T. HINCKS, AN AUTHOR OF LIFE 146 (2018). 
 4. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2162. 
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his claim in federal court under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 at that time.”5  While 
a seemingly modest ruling at first blush, Knick in fact marks a sea change 
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and 
promises to have a significant impact on the development of takings law 
and litigation practices nationwide by overruling key aspects of William-
son County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of John-
son City in a manner that provides more predictability for property rights 
jurisprudence. 6 
The Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use without just compensation.”7  For years, the Court 
was divided on whether this provision prohibits an uncompensated tak-
ing or merely operates as a condition on the government’s otherwise un-
restrained power of eminent domain.8  The distinction between these two 
approaches is dramatic.9  If the Fifth Amendment is interpreted as a con-
dition, then a taking is arguably incomplete, and thus not ripe for federal 
suit until a property owner exhausts procedures for obtaining compensa-
tion.  On the other hand, if interpreted as a prohibition, then a property 
owner’s dispute ripens immediately at the time an uncompensated taking 
occurs. 
The Court itself has confused these interpretations. Adopting the 
“conditional power” interpretation, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1985 de-
cision in Williamson County concluded that a property owner whose 
property has been taken by a local government has not suffered a viola-
tion of his Fifth Amendment rights— and thus cannot bring a federal 
takings claim in federal court—until a state court has denied his claim 
for just compensation under state law.10  Thus, Williamson County held 
that an owner whose property has in fact been taken by a local 
 
 5. Id. at 2168. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion in which Justices 
Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. 
Justice Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and So-
tomayor joined. 
 6. 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2162; Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 
2170. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 8. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482 
U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (explaining that the Takings Clause is “designed not to limit the gov-
ernmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the 
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”). 
 9. See David J. Kochan, The [Takings] Keepings Clause: An Analysis of Framing Ef-
fects from Labeling Constitutional Rights, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1069-81 (2018) (dis-
cussing the effect that labeling has on judicial understanding and enforcement of constitu-
tional provisions). 
 10. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 
(1985). 
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government must first sue in the state courts, under the state constitution, 
and be denied relief before a federal takings claim will ripen.11 
Williamson County’s approach to the Fifth Amendment had conse-
quences that went far beyond what the justices had contemplated when 
establishing what it believed to be a ripeness rule.  Most notably, in the 
2005 decision San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, the U.S. Supreme Court held that adverse findings and conclu-
sions entered by a state court had both res judicata and collateral estoppel 
effects and will preclude a subsequent federal claim.12  In combination, 
Williamson County and San Remo effectively barred property owners 
from seeking relief for a federal constitutional violation in a federal 
court—unless, of course, the government opted to remove the claim to 
the federal court as allowed by City of Chicago v. International College 
of Surgeons.13  Even removal, however, did not ensure that a property 
owner could have his or her claims heard by a federal court. In some 
jurisdictions, the federal courts endorsed a defense strategy whereby the 
government would remove the case to the federal district court, only to 
have it dismissed as unripe.14  In those jurisdictions, the property owner 
was denied access to both federal and state courts, leaving the owner 
with no remedy for a constitutional violation.15 
As Justice Breyer recognized during the first Knick argument, it 
would have been easy for the Court to deal with the more serious conse-
quences of the state litigation rule by writing a line or two into an opin-
ion.16  But such a ruling would have left the theoretical underpinnings of 
Williamson County in place, with all of its attendant consequences.  
Therefore, Knick overruled Williamson County on three express grounds 
by holding that the state litigation requirement (1) “rests on a mistaken 
 
 11. See Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory 
Takings, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 99, 103 (2000). 
 12. See generally San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 13. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 174 (1997). Interna-
tional College of Surgeons confirmed that government retains the discretion to remove takings 
claims alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the federal courts regardless of the local 
nature of the dispute; thus, creating removal imbalance that gave the government the power 
to select the forum in most circumstances. 
 14. See, e.g., Ohad Assocs., LLC v. Township of Marlboro, No. 10-2183, 2011 WL 
310708, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2011). Other jurisdictions saw through this gambit and would 
either remand the matter to state court, for example, Doak Homes, Inc. v. City of Tukwila, No. 
C07-1148MJP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7740, at *11-12 (W.D. Wash. Jan 18, 2008), or deem 
that the government waived the state litigation ripeness requirement by removing the claim. 
See, e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 549 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2018) (No. 17-647), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran-
scripts/2018/17-647_aplc.pdf. 
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view of the Fifth Amendment”; (2) “conflicts with the rest of our takings 
jurisprudence”; and (3) “imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings 
plaintiffs.”17  The Court further concluded that “[f]idelity to the Takings 
Clause and our cases construing it requires overruling Williamson 
County and restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional sta-
tus the Framers envisioned when they included the Clause among the 
other protections in the Bill of Rights.”18  Knick concluded that the plain 
language of the Takings Clause prohibits an uncompensated taking.19  
Thus, a property owner suffers a constitutional violation at the moment 
the government takes his property without paying compensation.20  The 
fact that the government may provide compensation later (if ordered to 
do so by a court) does not change the fact that a constitutional violation 
occurred.21  As Chief Justice Roberts illustrated, “A bank robber might 
give the loot back, but he still robbed the bank.”22 
From a practical perspective, Knick restores balance to takings liti-
gation by providing the owner with the option of immediately filing a 
federal claim in the federal courts when a local government action takes 
their private property.23  Furthermore, Knick also signals a reinvigorated 
approach to the Takings Clause which will likely have ramifications far 
beyond the case.24  To adequately illustrate Knick’s impact on takings 
practice, Section II of this Article describes the historical development 
of takings litigation and the development of the ripeness doctrine, cul-
minating in the state litigation and preclusion rules adopted by William-
son County and San Remo Hotel.  Section III provides the factual and 
legal background for the Knick decision, while Section IV provides an 
analysis of the decision.  Section V discusses the importance of access 
to federal courts for civil rights plaintiffs.  The Article concludes with 
 
 17. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 18. Id. at 2170. 
 19. See id. at 2167-68. 
 20. Id. at 2168. 
 21. Id. at 2172. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Knick will also have a significant impact on Washington takings law by overruling 
state precedent holding that “a constitutional violation does not result” unless and until an 
owner is denied just compensation in a state proceeding. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 
621, 666 (1987); see also Sintra v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 19-20 (1992) (“[I]f a 
landowner fails to seek compensation through state judicial procedures, a [federal] takings 
claim is said to be not yet ripe.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Opinion analysis: Court overrules takings precedent, al-
lowing more suits in federal court, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2019), https://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-court-overrules-takings-precedent-allowing-more-
suits-in-federal-court/; The Editorial Board, The Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment Reclama-
tion, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-courts-fifth-
amendment-reclamation-11561318947; Sibilla, supra note 2. 
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Section V, which surveys the changes and challenges that takings prac-
titioners will face in a post-Knick environment. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To understand the impact that Williamson County’s state litigation 
requirement has on property rights, it is necessary to briefly review the 
general framework of takings law. 
A. Overview of Takings Law 
Over the years, the Court has recognized that the government may 
take private property in a variety of ways.25  The most straightforward 
situation occurs when it institutes eminent domain proceedings in a court 
of law.  In such proceedings, the government declares its intent to take 
property for a public use and deposits funds in anticipation of its duty to 
pay just compensation for the taking.26  Assuming the validity of the 
public use, the only disputed issues relate to the amount of compensation 
due and how and when the owner will receive it.  In these takings cases, 
the just compensation requirement functions predominately as a condi-
tion on the government’s power to complete eminent domain proceed-
ings.  A taking is final and legitimate when the owner receives adequate 
compensation.27 
A taking can alternatively occur through administrative and legis-
lative actions without the government initiating condemnation proceed-
ings.  Such regulatory takings are a species of what is known as inverse 
condemnation because, while not explicitly designed to condemn prop-
erty, they cause an impact on property that is tantamount to a taking.28  
The clearest example is a government action that causes a permanent 
“physical occupation” of private property.29  Such a physical taking oc-
curs when the government physically occupies or seizes property for its 
own use.30  It can also occur when the government authorizes third par-
ties, including members of the general public, to enter and use private 
 
 25. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012) (noting 
“the nearly infinite variety of ways in which government actions or regulations can affect 
property interests”). 
 26. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1984). 
 27. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1939) (“[T]itle does not pass until 
compensation has been ascertained and paid . . . .” (quoting Hanson Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923)); First English, 482 U.S. at 320 (In “condemnation proceed-
ings a taking does not occur until compensation is determined and paid . . . .”). 
 28. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (explaining that regulatory tak-
ings are a subset of inverse condemnation). 
 29. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1982). 
 30. Kirby, 467 U.S. at 5; Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002). 
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property.31  A taking may also arise when governmental actions restrict 
the use of private property.  Such a “regulatory taking” automatically 
occurs when a regulation deprives property of “all economically benefi-
cial use[].”32  Under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City,33 a regulation can also cause a taking, even if it does not deprive 
private property of all economically beneficial use, depending on “the 
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it 
interferes with legitimate property interests.”34 
The distinction between condemnation and inverse condemnation 
is of critical importance. In the former circumstance, the government in-
vokes a statutory process whereby it acknowledges its constitutional ob-
ligation to pay compensation and establishes a process for determining 
how much is due.35  In the latter circumstance, the government denies 
that a taking occurred; thus, questions concerning compensation must 
await a judicial determination of constitutional liability under the Tak-
ings Clause.36  In this context, the Just Compensation Clause only kicks 
in after a determination of liability and operates only to prescribe the 
remedy for a taking.37  The Just Compensation Clause thus operates as 
an indemnification guarantee when the government acts to take property 
without directly condemning it.38 
B. The Takings Ripeness Doctrine 
Courts have long insisted that cases be sufficiently clear, or “ripe,” 
before a court will render judgment.39  The basic rationale for this doc-
trine is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudica-
tion, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over 
 
 31. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). 
 32. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 33. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 34. Lingle, 545 U.S. at 540; see also United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) 
(“The phrase ‘inverse condemnation’ appears to be . . . a shorthand description of the manner 
in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condem-
nation proceedings have not been instituted.”). 
 35. See First English, 482 U.S. at 315-16; see also Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Marin 
Cty., 653 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The issue is not the same in condemnation cases 
and in inverse condemnation cases. In condemnation cases the issue is damages: How much 
is due the landowner as just compensation? In inverse condemnation the issue is liability: Has 
the government’s action effected a taking of the landowner’s property?”). 
 36. See id. at 316. 
 37. See First English, 482 U.S. at 316 (explaining that the Takings Clause requires a 
“compensation remedy” “in the event of a taking.”). 
 38. See generally Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S., 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (The 
Fifth Amendment declares “that no private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless 
a full and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner.”). 
 39. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 735-38 (1997) (reviewing cases). 
1. Hodges - Knick v. Township.docx (Do Not Delete)5/22/20  1:22 PM 
8 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
administrative policies and also to protect the agencies from judicial in-
terference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its 
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.40  Although this 
doctrine may seem innocuous, when it is misapplied, the doctrine acts as 
an inflexible barrier to the courts (and, by extension, a barrier to one’s 
constitutional guarantees). 
Historically, the Supreme Court held that a property owner must 
refrain from asserting a taking claim until a governmental action limiting 
property rights is sufficiently concrete and final so that a claim is ripe.41  
For example, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 
Inc., the Court held that a property owner raising an as-applied regula-
tory takings claim had to pursue “administrative solutions” capable of 
reducing the impact of challenged regulations (such as a “variance”) to 
secure a final agency decision and a ripe claim.42 
Williamson County confirmed this finality ripeness doctrine, at 
least initially.  There, a developer asserted that application of certain land 
use regulations temporarily deprived it of all economically viable use of 
property.43  The Court granted certiorari to decide whether damages were 
a proper remedy for a temporary regulatory taking under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.44  But, after reviewing the case, the Court concluded that it could 
not reach that question because the case was unripe.45 
Drawing on Hodel, the Williamson County Court explained that a 
claim asserting that land use restrictions cause a taking, will not ripen 
until the government reaches a “final decision” on the application of the 
challenged regulations to the plaintiff’s property.46  The Court empha-
sized that a final decision will often not arise until the property owner 
used available variance procedures within the regulatory scheme that 
might allow the government to soften the challenged property re-
strictions.47  On this requirement, the Court determined that the takings 
claimant need not exhaust all state remedies to obtain a final decision: 
[T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial de-
cisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that in-
flicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement gener-
ally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an 
 
 40. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). 
 41. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013). 
 42. 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981). 
 43. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186-90. 
 44. Id. at 185. 
 45. Id. at 186. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. at 191-92. 
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injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a 
remedy . . . .48 
The Court then held that the plaintiff in Williamson County had not 
secured a final decision because it failed to seek variances that might 
have allowed it to expand the allowable use of the property.49 
The Supreme Court refined the finality requirement in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, where it recognized that the government cannot “burden 
property by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in or-
der to avoid a final decision.”50  Palazzolo also holds that a takings claim 
likely ripens once there is a reasonable degree of certainty that the gov-
ernment agency lacks further discretion to permit or deny development 
or use of land.51  The reasonable measure test provided by the Court in 
Palazzolo reflects the observation by lower courts that some form of a 
“futility exception” exists to the ripeness finality requirement.52 
Under this settled understanding of the doctrine, the availability of 
state just compensation remedies for a taking is irrelevant to ripeness.53  
If a governmental burden on property is final and concrete, the owner 
may sue to establish that it is a taking, warranting compensation.54  The 
“owner has a right to bring an ‘inverse condemnation’ suit . . . on the 
date of the intrusion” alleged as a taking.55 
C. Williamson County’s State Litigation Requirement 
Williamson County should have ended with the application of the 
final decision ripeness rule. Yet, in dicta, and without briefing from the 
parties, the Court went on to articulate a second, ripeness barrier: the 
state litigation requirement.56  In so doing, the Court started with the ob-
servation that the Just Compensation Clause “proscribes” takings “with-
out just compensation.”57  From there, it stated that the Clause does not 
“require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporane-
ously with, the taking; all that is required is that a ‘reasonable, certain 
 
 48. Id. at 192-93. 
 49. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 193-94. 
 50. 533 U.S. 606, 621 (2001). 
 51. Id. at 620. 
 52. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Tak-
ings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 102 (2014) (citing S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los An-
geles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 53. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 192-93. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 5. 
 56. As noted in Knick, the state litigation requirement was raised by the U.S. Solicitor 
General in an amicus brief as an alternative basis for affirming the court of appeals’ decision. 
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174. 
 57. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194. 
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and adequate provision for obtaining compensation’ exist at the time of 
the taking.”58  This led the Court to conclude that “[i]f the government 
has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if re-
sort to that process ‘yield[s] just compensation,’ then the property owner 
‘has no claim against the Government’ for a taking.”59  This ultimately 
meant “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just com-
pensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Com-
pensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation.”60  The Court indicated that the claim in Williamson 
County was unripe under the new principle because the plaintiff had not 
filed an inverse condemnation suit—a judicial action—under Tennessee 
law in Tennessee state court.61  Later, the Court characterized William-
son County’s “state procedures” ripeness requirement as a “state litiga-
tion” requirement—a requirement that “finds no parallel in the ripeness 
cases from other areas of law.”62 
1. Outright Bar to Federal Courts 
Williamson County led to the practice of property owners filing 
state-based takings claims in state court while “reserving” any federal 
claims for subsequent litigation in federal court pursuant to England v. 
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.63  This “English reserva-
tion” strategy, however, only lasted until San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City 
and County of San Francisco, in which the Court brought the full effect 
of the state litigation rule to light.64 
San Remo involved a takings challenge to San Francisco’s require-
ment that hotel owners pay a special fee when they converted room rent-
als from long-term residential tenancies to overnight accommodations 
for tourists.65  The owners filed first in state court, reserving their federal 
 
 58. Id. (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974)). 
 59. Id. at 194-95 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 n.21 
(1984)). 
 60. Id. at 195. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 22 (1995); see generally Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (First 
Amendment); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Equal Protection); 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (Fourth Amendment). 
 63. 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You Can Never 
Leave: The Story of San Remo Hotel—The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims 
to State Courts Under a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 252-58 (2006). 
 64. 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005). 
 65. Id. at 326-28. Writing in dissent, California Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers 
Brown assailed the challenged law as “redefin[ing] the American dream.” San Remo Hotel 
L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 27 Cal. 4th 643, 692 (2002) (Brown, J., dissenting). She continued, 
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claims, and lost.66  In any event, after losing at the state Supreme Court, 
the owners filed a new federal case, this time asserting the federal claims 
that they had reserved in the state court proceedings.67  The District 
Court and Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that the state claim pre-
cluded the federal claim because the federal courts owed full faith and 
credit to the state courts’ judgments, and thus refused to consider the 
takings claims de novo.68 
The San Remo owners successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court to review the Ninth Circuit decision, arguing that they did not run 
afoul of Williamson County because they had not litigated their federal 
claims in state court.69  The Court, however, affirmed.70  While San 
Remo’s argument demonstrated the injustice of Williamson County, it 
did not provide the optimal angle of attack.  Indeed, during oral argu-
ment, Justice O’Connor asked the owners whether they had sought to 
overturn Williamson County.  When counsel said “no,” Justice O’Con-
nor responded that “maybe you should have.”71 
The Court explained that because the owner could have filed the 
federal claim in state court, he should have.72  And because the federal 
claim could have been litigated in state court, the judgment of the state 
court must control under the Full Faith and Credit Act.73  In other words, 
it was now impossible to pursue a federal takings claim seeking com-
pensation in federal court, regardless of any reservation.  Williamson 
County and San Remo thus made takings claims against local govern-
ments the only constitutionally protected right that could not be vindi-
cated in federal court.74 
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in 
the Court’s decision, but as Justice Rehnquist noted, “[i]t is not clear to 
me that Williamson County was correct in demanding that, once a gov-
ernment entity has reached a final decision with respect to a claimant’s 
 
“[w]here once government was closely constrained to increase the freedom of individuals, 
now property ownership is closely constrained to increase the power of government. Where 
once government was a necessary evil because it protected private property, now private prop-
erty is a necessary evil because it funds government programs.” Id. 
 66. See San Remo, 27 Cal. 4th at 649-50; see also San Remo, 545 U.S. at 326-27. 
 67. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 326. 
 68. Id. at 327. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 336-41. 
 71. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 
323 (2005) (No. 04-340), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran-
scripts/2004/04-340.pdf. 
 72. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347. 
 73. See id. at 347-48. 
 74. Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409, 1410-11 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
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property, the claimant must seek compensation in state court before 
bringing a federal takings claim in federal court.”75  Justice Rehnquist 
continued, 
I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson County.  But further 
reflection and experience lead me to think that the justifications for 
its state-litigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on tak-
ings plaintiffs is dramatic.  Here, no court below has addressed the 
correctness of Williamson County, neither party has asked us to re-
consider it, and resolving the issue could not benefit petitioners.  In 
an appropriate case, I believe the Court should reconsider whether 
plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings claim based on the 
final decision of a state or local government entity must first seek 
compensation in state courts.76 
The ultimate result of the San Remo decision was that, when a prop-
erty owner unsuccessfully pursues a claim for compensation in state 
court to comply with Williamson County, the claim was thereafter 
barred from federal courts—no claim was ripened.77  “The takings plain-
tiff thus finds himself in a Catch-22: He cannot go to federal court with-
out going to state court first; but if he goes to state court and loses, his 
claim will be barred in federal court.  The federal claim dies aborning.”78 
2. Supreme Court Attempts to Soften the Impact of the State 
Litigation Rule 
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court attempted to both pre-
serve Williamson County while at the same time softening the impact of 
the state litigation rule by explaining that Williamson County should not 
be viewed as having established a jurisdictional bar to litigating takings 
cases in federal courts, but instead was intended only as “a discretionary, 
prudential ripeness doctrine.”79  For example, in Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection the 
Court considered whether a beach renourishment project deprived shore-
line owners of their littoral rights and the Court summarily rejected the 
 
 75. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 349 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 352. 
 77. See id. at 346-47; Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1410-11; Trafalgar Corp. v. Miami Cty. Bd. 
of Comm’rs, 519 F.3d 285, 287 (6th Cir. 2008) (because “the issue of just compensation under 
the Takings clause . . . was directly decided in a previous state court action, it cannot be re-
litigated in federal district court”). 
 78. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 79. J. David Breemer, The Rebirth of Federal Takings Review? The Courts’ “Pruden-
tial” Answer to Williamson County’s Flawed State Litigation Ripeness Requirement, 30 
TOURO L. REV. 319, 339-40 (2014) [hereinafter Rebirth of Federal Takings Review]; see also 
Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733–34 (noting that the ripeness requirements of Williamson County are 
prudential). 
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government’s Williamson County argument because the ripeness objec-
tion was not jurisdictional and was therefore waived when the govern-
ment failed to raise the issue in response to the petition for a writ of 
certiorari.80  A few years later in Horne v. Department of Agriculture,81 
the Court again explained that “prudential ripeness” is “not, strictly 
speaking, jurisdictional.”82  In a footnote, the Court clarified that a 
“[c]ase or [c]ontroversy exists once the government has taken private 
property without paying for it.  Accordingly, whether an alternative rem-
edy exists does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal court.”83 
3. Confusion Among the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
The Supreme Court, by emphasizing the prudential nature of the 
state litigation rule in Stop the Beach and Horne seemed to indicate that 
the lower federal courts may directly address takings claims against local 
governments under the right circumstances.84  In practice, however, this 
attempt to relax the state litigation requirement caused even more con-
fusion and unpredictable application of the rule.  A few federal courts, 
acknowledging the prudential nature of the state litigation rule, declined 
invitations to dismiss federal takings claims, but this was a hit or miss 
affair.85  Others recognized that facial claims and claims not seeking 
monetary damages for takings could be heard in federal courts.86  But 
still other federal courts began to extend the reach of Williamson County 
to all property-related claims, even those that sounded in Due Process, 
Equal Protection, or even the First Amendment.87  In other words, the 
 
 80. 560 U.S. 702, 729-30 (2010). 
 81. 569 U.S. 513 (2013). 
 82. Id. at 526. 
 83. Id. at 526 n.6 (internal quotations omitted). 
 84. See Rebirth of Federal Takings Review, supra note 79, at 339. 
 85. Compare Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (using 
prudential ripeness considerations to directly address the takings issue), and Peters v. Village 
of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Williamson County’s ripeness requirements 
are prudential in nature. The prudential character of the Williamson County requirements do 
not, however, give the lower federal courts license to disregard them.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 139 v. Schimel, 863 F.3d 674, 678 
(7th Cir. 2017); Clayland Farm Enters. v. Talbot Cty., 672 F. App’x 240, 243-44 (4th Cir. 
2016); Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, 727 F.3d 1349, 1359 n.6 (11th 
Cir. 2013); Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 
2012); Asociacion De Subscripcion Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. 
Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007); Peters v. Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 
2007); Philip Morris v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 87. See, e.g., River Park v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that substantive and procedural due process land use claims are subject to Williamson 
County); J.B. Ranch v. Grand Cty., 958 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Williamson 
County to plaintiff’s substantive due process claim); Murphy v. New Milford Zoning 
Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 350, 353 (2d Cir. 2005); Kurtz v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 758 F.3d 506, 
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state of Williamson County was becoming increasingly unpredictable 
and chaotic in the lower federal courts. 
By the time the Court granted certiorari in Knick, the federal circuit 
courts of appeals were deeply divided on whether the state litigation re-
quirement imposed a jurisdictional barrier to the federal courts or simply 
required a prudential evaluation.88  The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits explicitly described the prudential nature of ripeness and 
reserved discretion in applying the state action prong accordingly.89  The 
Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits appeared to be on the verge of treat-
ing the second prong as prudential, but expressed hesitance in allowing 
the lower courts to use discretion when applying the doctrine, noting that 
that the prudential nature of the Williamson County requirements “do[es] 
not, however, give the lower federal courts license to disregard them.”90  
Meanwhile, the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits continued to strictly 
apply the state litigation rule as a jurisdictional barrier to federal re-
view.91 
Making matters even more unpredictable, Williamson County in-
spired gamesmanship in some jurisdictions, where local governments, 
after being sued in a state court, as required by Williamson County, 
would remove the case to federal court.  Removal by takings claim de-
fendants (and only by defendants) had been endorsed in City of Chicago 
v. International College of Surgeons.92  But once in federal court, the 
defendants would move to dismiss the case under Williamson County’s 
state litigation requirement.  Some federal courts readily agreed, 
 
515 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that Williamson County “has been extended to equal protec-
tion and due process claims asserted in the context of land use challenges”) (citations omitted). 
 88. Rebirth of Federal Takings Review, supra note 79, at 340-41; David L. Callies, 
Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN 
L.J. 43, 97, 101 (2014). 
 89. See Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 2014); Wilkins v. Dan-
iels, 744 F.3d 409, 418 (6th Cir. 2014); Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church v. New Orleans 
City, 641 F.3d 86, 88-89 (5th Cir. 2011); Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 399 
(4th Cir. 2013); Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545; Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 
1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 
1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (exercising its discretion not to impose the “prudential requirement 
of exhaustion in state court” (quoting Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1118), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
900 (2014). 
 90. Peters v. Village of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Alto Eldorado 
P’ship v. Cty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Cty. Concrete 
Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d. Cir. 2006). 
 91. See Marek v. Rhode Island, 702 F.3d 650, 653-54 (1st Cir. 2012); see also 126th 
Ave. Landfill, Inc. v. Pinellas Cty., 459 F.App’x 896, 899-900 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Snaza 
v. City of Saint Paul, 548 F.3d 1178, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 92. 522 U.S. at 163-66 (1997). 
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potentially leaving the plaintiff with no avenue for relief.93  Other federal 
courts began to catch on to this scheme, ruling that by removing the case 
to federal court, the defendants had waived their right to dismiss.94  Thus, 
by the time the Knick certiorari petition was filed, the lower courts were 
in a state of utter disarray on the simple question how a property owner 
can file a claim for a violation of the Fifth Amendment in the federal 
courts. 
III. BACKGROUND: KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT 
A. Factual Background 
The case, Knick v. Township of Scott, provided an all-too-common 
example of how the state litigation rule operated to bar an individual 
from enforcing her federal constitutional rights.  At issue was an ordi-
nance that authorized officials from the Township of Scott, Pennsylva-
nia, to freely enter private property to determine if it contained a burial 
site and, if it is determined that one is present, created a public easement 
from the nearest public road and to any cemetery lying on private land.95  
Although the subject of the law may seem extraordinary or unusual, it is 
actually quite common to find private family gravesites throughout rural 
Pennsylvania with burial plots dating back hundreds of years.96 
In 1970, Rose Mary Knick and her family purchased 90 acres of 
farmland in the Township.97  Almost forty years later, Township officials 
contacted Ms. Knick in response to a public inquiry about a purported 
 
 93. Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1411 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Koscielski 
v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a removed 
takings claim for lack of finished state court procedures); 8679 Trout, LLC v. N. Tahoe Pub. 
Util. Dist., No. 2:10CV01569MCE EFB, 2010 WL 3521952, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) 
(“Although the claim was ripe when it was originally filed in state court, it became unripe the 
moment that Defendants removed it.”). It is true that some federal courts will remand a re-
moved takings claim to state court, rather than dismiss it, upon finding the claim unripe under 
Williamson County. See, e.g., Del-Prairie Stock Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Walworth, 572 F. Supp. 
2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008). This outcome is of little solace to the plaintiff. That removed 
and remanded litigant has been involuntarily yanked from the state court—which is suppos-
edly the only proper forum for a takings claim—to a federal court—which is not a proper 
forum—only to be sent back to the state court where it all began, without any hearing in the 
process. Through it all, valuable resources and time are wasted, and the government may pre-
vail by attrition. 
 94. See, e.g., Sansotta, 724 F. 3d at 544; see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 
U.S. 132, 140 (2005) (“The process of removing a case to federal court and then having it 
remanded back to state court delays resolution of the case, imposes additional costs on both 
parties, and wastes judicial resources.”). 
 95. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 96. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 97. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 4, Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019) (No. 17-647) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits]; Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. 
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historic grave on her property.98  Ms. Knick had no knowledge of any 
burial sites on her property and was not aware of any physical evidence 
of a grave on her land.99  Several years later, after continued demands 
from an individual who wanted to visit the putative grave site, the Town-
ship enacted an ordinance forcing property owners to open their land to 
the public if Township officials determine that it contains a gravesite.100  
The ordinance authorizes fines of $300-$600 per day for noncompliance, 
plus all court costs, including attorney fees.101 
A few months later, on April 10, 2013, the Township’s code en-
forcement officer entered Ms. Knick’s land without her consent to search 
for evidence of a burial plot.102  A day later, the Township issued a notice 
of violation, informing her that an “inspection” of her land identified 
“[m]ultiple grave markers/tombstones.”103  According to the notice, 
stones located on Ms. Knick’s property qualified as a “cemetery” under 
the ordinance.  The notice declared that Ms. Knick was “in violation of 
section # 5 . . . which requires that all cemeteries within the Township 
shall be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight 
hours.”104  Then, a few months later, the Township issued a second, al-
most identical notice of violation—it too commanded Ms. Knick to 
“make access to the cemetery available to the public.”105 
B. Judicial Procedure 
1. State Court Proceedings 
Shortly after the Township issued the first notice of violation, Ms. 
Knick filed a lawsuit in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, 
claiming that the Township’s adoption and enforcement of the cemetery 
ordinance effected a physical taking of an easement without compensa-
tion.106  In response, the Township withdrew its notice of violation and 
agreed to stay any enforcement action.107  The court, thereafter, refused 
to rule on Ms. Knick’s takings claim, concluding that her claims would 
not be ripe until the Township filed a separate civil enforcement action 
 
 98. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168; see also Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 
4. 
 99. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 4-5. 
 100. Id. at 5. 
 101. Knick, 862 F.3d at 315; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 5-6. 
 102. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 6. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 6-7. 
 105. Id. at 7. 
 106. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 7. 
 107. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. 
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against Ms. Knick.108  The state court’s decision left the ordinance in 
place and left Ms. Knick subject to future enforcement actions for inter-
fering with the public’s right to access her land. 
2. Federal Procedure 
At this point, Ms. Knick turned to the federal district court for relief. 
She filed a complaint alleging that the ordinance, on its face and as ap-
plied, violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as enforced 
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.109  The district court, however, dismissed Ms. 
Knick’s takings claims as unripe under Williamson County until she fully 
litigated an “inverse condemnation” action in state court.110  On appeal, 
the Third Circuit noted the “extraordinary and constitutionally suspect” 
nature of the ordinance, but nonetheless upheld the district court’s order 
of dismissal for lack of ripeness under Williamson County’s state litiga-
tion requirement.111  Thus, like many property owners before her, Ms. 
Knick was denied access to either state or federal court to enforce rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 
On October 31, 2017, Ms. Knick filed a petition for a writ of certi-
orari with the Supreme Court of the United States, asking “[w]hether 
the . . . Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson County . . . 
that requiring property owners to exhaust state court remedies to ripen 
federal takings claims.”112  The Court granted review on that question 
and set argument for October 3, 2018, which took place before an 8-
Justice Court.  After Justice Kavanaugh was seated, the Court ordered 
re-argument, which occurred on January 16, 2019.113 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
Knick overruled Williamson County on three grounds, finding that 
the state litigation requirement (1) “imposes an unjustifiable burden on 
takings plaintiffs,” (2) “rests on a mistaken view of the Fifth Amend-
ment,” and (3) “conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence.”114  
Overruling the Williamson County state litigation requirement enabled 
the Court to hold that “a government violates the Takings Clause when 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 8. 
 110. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) 
(No. 17-647). 
 113. Docket, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No. 17-647), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-
647.html. 
 114. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
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it takes property without compensation, and that a property owner may 
bring a Fifth Amendment claim under § 1983 at that time.”115 
A. Williamson County Imposed “an Unjustifiable Burden” on Takings 
Plaintiffs 
The undue burden that Williamson County placed on property own-
ers is plain and is well-documented by legal scholars.116  Although the 
Court had envisioned a process by which an owner could ripen claims 
for federal review, the state litigation requirement proved instead to cre-
ate a barrier to the federal courts.  Since property owners cannot file a 
Fifth Amendment takings claim in federal court as an initial matter under 
Williamson County—and under San Remo Hotel cannot sue after a failed 
state court proceeding due to preclusion rules—they are forced to file 
Fifth Amendment claims in state court or not at all.117  Furthermore, 
compliance with the state litigation requirement set up the case to be 
removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis that it 
raises a “federal question.”118  In that circumstance, however, the claim 
was often found to be unripe under Williamson County because state 
compensation procedures remain unexhausted.119  This outcome was 
emblematic of the state litigation doctrine’s extraordinary and unworka-
ble character—because the injustice arises from perfect compliance with 
the doctrine. 
B. Williamson County Rested on a “Mistaken View of the Fifth 
Amendment” 
The Knick majority began its legal analysis by emphasizing that 
Williamson County was based on “a different view of how the Takings 
 
 115. Id. at 2177. 
 116. See, e.g., Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
553, 605 (2012) (“State courts thus get first bite at these actions under Williamson County—
and they get the only bite under San Remo”); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell 
Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings 
Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 687 (2004) (William-
son County and San Remo Hotel serve as a “mechanism for keeping property owners out of 
federal court”); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Rule in Regulatory 
Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 103 (2000); THOMAS ROBERTS, Ripeness and Forum 
Selection in Land-Use Litigation, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND 
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS (Am. Bar Ass’n, Callies ed., 1996). 
 117. See Rockstead v. City of Crystal Lake, 486 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 118. See Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 164 (affirming removal of a complaint in-
cluding a takings claim). 
 119. See, e.g., 8679 Trout, LLC v. N. Tahoe Pub. Util. Dist., No. 2:10CV01569MCE EFB, 
2010 WL 3521952, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (dismissing removed takings claim 
“for lack of jurisdiction”); see also Rebirth of Federal Takings Review, supra note 79, at 332-
38 (discussing cases endorsing the remove and dismiss strategy). 
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Clause works”—i.e., the conditional power approach.120  “According to 
Williamson County, a taking does not give rise to a federal constitutional 
right to just compensation at that time, but instead gives a right to a state 
law procedure that will eventually result in just compensation.”121  That 
was a mistake.  As Knick explains, “[t]he Clause provides: ‘[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.’  It 
does not say: ‘Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
an available procedure that will result in compensation.’”122  Based on 
the text of the Fifth Amendment, Knick held that “[i]f a local government 
takes private property without paying for it, that government has violated 
the Fifth Amendment—just as the Takings Clause says—without regard 
to subsequent state court proceedings.”123 
Knick explained that the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation 
guarantee is properly understood to provide the remedy for a taking—
the Amendment cannot be read to place a condition on the constitutional 
cause of action: 
A later payment of compensation may remedy the constitutional vi-
olation that occurred at the time of the taking, but that does not mean 
the violation never took place.  The violation is the only reason com-
pensation was owed in the first place.  A bank robber might give the 
loot back, but he still robbed the bank.  The availability of a subse-
quent compensation remedy for a taking without compensation no 
more means there never was a constitutional violation in the first 
place than the availability of a damages action renders negligent con-
duct compliant with the duty of care.124 
This interpretation of the Takings Clause finds its roots in Jacobs 
v. United States125 and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles,126 both of which held that a constitutional cause 
of action arises at the time of the taking.127  The fact that the Takings 
Clause prescribes a remedy—and is not a condition on a right—is im-
portant because “[t]he form of the remedy d[oes] not qualify the right. It 
rest[s] upon the Fifth Amendment.”128 
Knick’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment marks a critical de-
velopment in takings law. The “conditional right” approach adopted by 
 
 120. Knick,139 S. Ct. at 2171. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 2170. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 2172. 
 125. 290 U.S. 13 (1933). 
 126. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 127. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172. 
 128. Id. at 2170 (quoting Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16). 
1. Hodges - Knick v. Township.docx (Do Not Delete)5/22/20  1:22 PM 
20 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
Williamson County—and espoused by the dissent in Knick—had effec-
tively relegated the Takings Clause “ ‘ to the status of a poor relation’ 
among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”129  Williamson County had 
suggested that property rights were unlike all other rights secured by the 
Bill of Rights, which are immediately and directly enforceable in the 
federal courts when a state or local entity violates those rights.130  And 
none are subject to an exhaustion of state remedies requirement.131  
Knick’s decision restored property rights to the proper state of a full-
fledged right, finding that a “property owner has suffered a violation of 
his Fifth Amendment rights when the government takes his property 
without just compensation, and therefore may bring his claim in federal 
court under § 1983 at that time.”132 
C. Williamson County “Conflicts with the Rest of Our Takings 
Jurisprudence” 
As support for the state litigation requirement, Williamson County 
relied on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,133 and Parratt v. Taylor.134  Neither 
decision, however, imposed such a requirement on inverse condemna-
tion plaintiffs.135  Thus, Knick concluded that “Williamson County was 
not just wrong.  Its reasoning was exceptionally ill founded and con-
flicted with much of our takings jurisprudence.”136 
For example, Williamson County referred to Monsanto for the prop-
osition that, until a property owner has used the state’s procedure for 
securing compensation, the owner “has no claim against the Government 
for a taking.”137  But Monsanto arrived at no such conclusion.  There, the 
Court considered a pesticide company’s claim that provisions of the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act as applied caused an 
unconstitutional taking of property, by requiring disclosure of the com-
pany’s trade secrets.138  Importantly, the company bypassed the statutory 
arbitration procedure for securing damages, filing a lawsuit that sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief—not compensation.139  Monsanto ruled 
 
 129. Id. at 2169 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)). 
 130. See id. at 2167-68; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Prohibiting state actions 
that deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
 131. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) 
(quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982))). 
 132. Id. at 2168. 
 133. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 134. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 135. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 349 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 136. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 137. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194-95 (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21). 
 138. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 990. 
 139. See id. at 998-99. 
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only that equitable relief was not available under a takings theory in fed-
eral district court.140 
That conclusion “was enough to decide the case.”141  But Monsanto 
caused some confusion by commenting that “if the plaintiff obtained 
compensation in arbitration, then ‘no taking has occurred and the [plain-
tiff] has no claim against the Government.’ ” 142  That passage does not 
say that a takings plaintiff is required to exhaust all available state rem-
edies. Instead, as Knick explained, the passage merely states the obvious: 
that “a fully compensated plaintiff has no further claim, but that is be-
cause the taking has been remedied by compensation, not because there 
was no taking in the first place.”143  Williamson County’s reliance on 
Monsanto, therefore, was mistaken.144 
Williamson County also sought justification for its state litigation 
requirement on the Court’s repeated observation that the Takings Clause 
“ ‘does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid 
in advance of the occupancy of the land taken. But the owner is entitled 
to reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensa-
tion’ after a taking.”145  That observation, however, concerned claims for 
injunctive relief, noting that equitable relief is not available where there 
is such a provision for compensation.146  “Simply because the property 
owner was not entitled to injunctive relief at the time of the taking does 
not mean there was no violation of the Takings Clause at that time.”147 
Williamson County’s reliance on Parratt v. Taylor,148 was also mis-
placed.  “Like Monsanto, Parratt did not involve a takings claim for just 
compensation.”149  Instead, Parratt involved a due process claim.150  And 
ruling on that distinct claim, Parratt held that a prisoner who had been 
deprived of $23.50 worth of hobby materials by the rogue acts of a state 
employee could not state a procedural due process claim until he used 
 
 140. See id. at 1016. 
 141. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173. 
 142. Id. (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21). 
 143. Id. 
 144. “Williamson County also relied on Monsanto when it analogized its new state-litiga-
tion requirement to federal takings practice, stating that ‘taking[s] claims against the Federal 
Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided 
by the Tucker Act.’ But the Court was simply confused. A claim for just compensation 
brought under the Tucker Act is not a prerequisite to a Fifth Amendment takings claim—it is 
a Fifth Amendment takings claim.” Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174 (emphasis in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 145. Id. at 2175 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)). 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 149. Knick, 139 U.S. at 2174. 
 150. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543; see also Knick, 139 U.S. at 2174. 
1. Hodges - Knick v. Township.docx (Do Not Delete)5/22/20  1:22 PM 
22 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
available state post-deprivation remedies.151  In reaching that conclusion, 
Parratt reasoned that the state’s action is not complete in the sense of 
causing a due process injury unless or until the state fails to provide an 
adequate post-deprivation for the property loss.152  Knick explained that 
Parratt’s conclusion, which turned entirely on procedural due process 
law, was factually and legally distinct from the questions presented in an 
inverse condemnation lawsuit seeking a just compensation remedy for “ 
the taking of property by the government through physical invasion or a 
regulation that destroys a property’s productive use.”153  In the inverse 
condemnation context, a taking is complete once the government acts in 
a manner that deprives the owner on his or her property—there is no 
need or basis for the type of post-deprivation hearing that was specifi-
cally designed to satisfy the procedural requirements of due process.154  
Williamson County’s reliance on Parratt, therefore, was similarly mis-
taken. 
V. WHY DOES DIRECT ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS MATTER? 
The importance of direct access to the federal courts is frequently 
overlooked when a case involves a purely local regulation, such as city 
or county land use controls.  After all, people commonly think that a 
local court is the most appropriate forum in which to consider local reg-
ulations.155  And as long as a property owner can get to a state court to 
consider the legality and effect of a land use regulation, then the owner 
has had his or her day in court and there is no real harm. In contrast, 
Knick confirms that property rights are civil rights.156  And the American 
system for protecting individual civil rights rests on the understanding 
that federal courts will enforce those rights against abuse by local gov-
ernment and local agents. 
 
 151. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 529, 543-44; see also Knick, 139 U.S. at 2174. 
 152. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44. 
 153. Knick, 139 U.S. at 2174. 
 154. In Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court es-
tablished a three-part balancing to determine when a due process plaintiff is entitled to a pre- 
or post-deprivation hearing. That test directs the court to consider (1) “the private interest 
affected that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. 
 155. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 626-29 (2013) (J. Kagan, 
dissenting) (arguing that federal review threatens the ability for local government to respond 
to local conditions). 
 156. See generally Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2162. 
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It is true that the state courts generally have authority to address 
claims arising from the federal constitution, but the U.S. Constitution 
created the federal court system to ensure that federal laws and rights are 
fully enforced.157  This dual court system has not always been in place, 
however. Prior to the Civil War, the state and federal courts had dis-
tinctly different roles.158  At that time, the federal courts were largely 
limited to hearing claims against the federal government; thus, a person 
seeking to enforce her civil rights against a local government typically 
had to do so in the state courts.159 
This fractured approach to federal civil rights changed when the 
Reconstruction Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868.160  That amendment bound the states (and their political subdivi-
sions) to adhere to the fundamental concept that the state and local gov-
ernment may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.161  One of the main purposes of “incorporating” the 
Bill of Rights against state governments was to ensure that residents of 
all states enjoy at least a minimum level of protection for their basic con-
stitutional rights.162  Congress believed that access to the federal courts 
was essential to ensure a uniform national baseline of protection for con-
stitutional rights, including those protected by the Takings Clause.163 
Additionally, in 1871, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act.164  
This law created a federal cause of action when a state or local govern-
ment deprives an individual of a federal constitutional right.165  An in-
jured person could still go to state court, but they were no longer limited 
to that court system.166  Congress decided that federal courts should also 
be open to civil rights claims against local actors because state courts 
may not be completely neutral (or may be perceived to be biased) when 
they consider charges against a local politician or political body.167  Crit-
ically, the Civil Rights Act “undertook to … secure to all citizens of 
 
 157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and 
Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 960-61 (1987). 
 158. Nichol, supra note 157, at 960-61. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 162. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 
1193, 1218-19 (1992). 
 163. Id. at 1213-17. 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 165. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 363–64 (1983) (“The 
debates over the 1871 Act are replete with hostile comments directed at state judicial sys-
tems.”); see generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (1998). 
 166. Nichol, supra note 157, at 960-61. 
 167. Amar, supra note 162, at 1213-17. 
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every race and color … those fundamental rights which are the essence 
of civil freedom[.]”168  Among those fundamental rights are “the rights 
to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property.’ ” 169 
Thus, since the Civil Rights Act of 1871, part of “judicial federal-
ism” has been the availability of a federal cause of action when a local 
government violates the Constitution.170  The dual court system worked 
as intended for more than 100 years.  Citizens could sue in state or fed-
eral court when asserting that their property was taken without compen-
sation or if another one of their constitutional rights were violated.171  
Moreover, aggrieved citizens seeking federal protection did not have to 
try the state system first; they could go immediately to federal court with 
their claim.172  During this time, direct access to the federal courts pro-
moted a more uniform development of federal constitutional law.173 
There are practical reasons, too, why a property owner may prefer 
to litigate a takings claim in a federal court.  Perhaps most significantly, 
state courts vary widely on several takings doctrines that impact an 
owner’s procedural and substantive rights.  For example, the New York 
courts bar landowners from challenging a land use restriction in effect at 
the time of acquisition if that regulation grants the government discre-
tionary permitting authority.174  The federal courts, by contrast, typically 
 
 168. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883). 
 169. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 (1972) (“Equality in the enjoy-
ment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-
condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was 
intended to guarantee”); see also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment expressly incorpo-
rated the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property rights against the states). 
 170. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177 n.8. 
 171. See, e.g., Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1142 (9th Cir. 
1983) (considering inverse condemnation claim against local agency under § 1983). 
 172. Id. 
 173. As Justice Story explained in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347–48 (1816) 
(Story, J.), one of the most important reasons that the U.S. Supreme Court has ultimate juris-
diction over federal constitutional issues is “the importance, and even necessity of uniformity 
of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the 
constitution.” The Court also emphasized the danger of undermining uniformity by giving 
free reign to possible state court bias in favor of their own state governments: “The Constitu-
tion has presumed . . . that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state inter-
ests, might sometimes obstruct or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular 
administration of justice.” Id. at 347. 
 174. See, e.g., Kelleher v. N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 69 N.Y.S.3d 832, 832-33 
(2018); N.Y. Ins. Ass’n, Inc. v. New York, 41 N.Y.S.3d 149, 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); 
Novara ex rel. Jones v. Cantor Fitzgerald, LP, 795 N.Y.S.2d 133, 138 (2005); Linzenberg v. 
Town of Ramapo, 766 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218-19 (2003); Preble Aggregate, Inc. v. Town of Pre-
ble, 694 N.Y.S.2d 788, 793 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1999); Brotherton v. Dep’t of Envtl. Con-
servation, 675 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122-23 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1998); Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep’t 
of Envtl. Conservation, 89 N.Y.2d 603, 613-16 (1997). 
1. Hodges - Knick v. Township.docx (Do Not Delete)5/22/20  1:22 PM 
2020]  KNICK: GRAVEYARD DISPUTE RESURRECTS TAKINGS CLAUSE 25 
allow such claims to proceed to the merits.175  In that circumstance, ac-
cess to the federal courts is clearly preferable.   
Moreover, property owners forced to use state courts for their tak-
ings claims must use state rules and procedures.  These state rules are 
often more confusing and burdensome than the simple federal court pro-
cedures.176  On a federal level, a plaintiff must simply claim that the gov-
ernment took their property without providing or guaranteeing compen-
sation for the act—such an allegation will state a cause of action under 
42. U.S.C. § 1983. 
Direct access to the federal courts is also desirable when a property 
owner challenges the constitutionality of a locally enacted, and poten-
tially popular, regulation or policy.  Federal judges are typical viewed as 
being more removed from local politics than their state counterparts (a 
vast majority of whom are elected).177  The need to distance oneself from 
local politics is often pronounced in the context of takings law because 
the central purpose of the Takings Clause is to “bar Government from 
 
 175. See, e.g., Mehaffy v. United States, 499 F. App’x 18, 22 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Appolo 
Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 176. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168 n.1 (discussing Ohio’s procedure for remedying a tak-
ing). In California, for example, before a property owner can file a state takings claim, the 
owner must first seek a writ of administrative mandamus to invalidate the offending action, a 
time-consuming process that cannot result in damages. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Superior 
Court, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1488, 1496 (1989) (explaining that a property owner could not sue 
in inverse condemnation because he failed to file a petition for writ of administrative manda-
mus); see generally Mola Dev. Corp. v. City of Seal Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th (1997). If the 
challenged action is held invalid, the property owner’s injury is converted into a temporary 
one, which California precedent holds is not compensable. See generally Landgate, Inc. v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 17 Cal. 4th 1106 (1998). On the other hand, if the action is held valid 
in the mandamus phase, the owner may still be barred from bringing a cognizable inverse 
condemnation takings claim. Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1, 13 (1994), as modified 
on denial of reh’g (Sept. 22, 1994) (“If the alleged taking is a ‘regulatory taking’ … the owner 
must afford the state the opportunity to rescind the ordinance or regulation or to exempt the 
property from the allegedly invalid development restriction once it has been judicially deter-
mined that the proposed application of the ordinance to the property will constitute a compen-
sable taking.”). Under this “mandamus first” process, the powerful California Coastal Com-
mission has never had to pay compensation for actions amounting to a taking. See, e.g., 
Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 1267-69 (1991) (find-
ing a taking in the mandamus proceeding, but no damages awarded); Liberty v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 503 (1980). 
 177. See Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 
6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 91, 99–100 (2011) (discussing this distinction and its implica-
tions for takings jurisprudence). While conscientious judges will surely try to rule impartially, 
their political and institutional loyalties could easily influence their decisions, consciously or 
not. Id. at 99. Such dangers make a federal forum for ensuring the protection of constitutional 
rights essential. Jeri Zeder, Elected vs. Appointed?, HARV. L. TODAY (July 1, 2012), https://to-
day.law.harvard.edu/book-review/in-new-book-shugerman-explores-the-history-of-judicial-
selection-in-the-u-s/ (“Today, about 90 percent of state judges must run for office, and the 
elections have become increasingly expensive and nasty.”). 
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forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”178 
The Takings Clause’s anti-majoritarian mandate creates natural 
tension—perceived or otherwise—when a local court is tightly bound to 
community pressure.  Indeed, this tension animated much of the dispute 
in this case.  The United States filed an amicus brief arguing that gov-
ernment officials should be free to implement regulatory programs 
“without fear” of the Takings Clause “even when” the program is so far 
reaching that the officials “cannot determine whether a taking will oc-
cur.”179  Justice Kagan, writing in dissent to Knick, echoed this concern, 
suggesting that a reinvigorated Takings Clause will chill regulatory ac-
tion by “turn[ing] even well-meaning government officials into law-
breakers.”180  According to Justice Kagan, the Court’s recognition that 
the Fifth Amendment is violated at the time the government takes prop-
erty (rather than a later date when the owner is wrongfully denied com-
pensation), is unfair to the government because it “means that govern-
ment regulators will often have no way to avoid violating the 
Constitution.”181  This, she worries, will have a chilling effect on an of-
ficial who could, before Knick, “do his work without fear of wrongdo-
ing.”182 
The risk of regulatory paralysis, however, is unlikely to occur.  Lo-
cal governments have always had to weigh the likelihood that their ac-
tions may give rise to liabilities; allowing a property owner to file a tak-
ings claim in federal court does not change that.183  It only provides 
landowners with an alternative avenue for relief.  The risk of liability, 
moreover, is in the nature of the Constitution, which places limits on 
lawful government authority.  Thus, Justice Thomas responded in his 
concurring opinion that, if the Fifth Amendment “makes some regula-
tory programs ‘unworkable in practice,’ so be it—our role is to enforce 
the Takings Clause as written.”184  “So long as the property owner has 
some way to obtain compensation after the fact, governments need not 
fear that courts will enjoin their activities.”185   
 
 178. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 179. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Supplemental Letter Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5). 
 180. Id. at 2187 (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) 
(holding that a zoning ordinance must substantially advance a legitimate government interest 
to satisfy the constitution). 
 184. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Supplemental Letter 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5) (internal citations omitted). 
 185. Id. at 2168. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
By overruling Williamson County’s state litigation requirement, 
Knick reset the game board for takings litigation jurisdiction in a number 
of ways.  Most notably, Knick abandoned the removal imbalance created 
by International College of Surgeons, which held that only defendants 
could remove a takings claim to federal court.186  Property owners may 
now remove such claims or file a federal takings claim directly in federal 
court, “without regard to subsequent state court proceedings.”187  But 
owners still have the option to bring a § 1983 claim in state court if they 
believe that it would provide a better forum (Of course, federal claims 
filed in a state court are still subject to removal to federal court by mu-
nicipal defendants).188   
If the property owner opts to file a federal takings claim in federal 
court, the cause of action is § 1983 and the remedy sought should be 
limited to just compensation unless monetary relief is unavailable, in 
which case declaratory relief may be available.189  For example, a prop-
erty owner may ask a court to enjoin a regulatory taking, or declare a 
statute or regulation unconstitutional, if the takings claim is raised in de-
fense to imposition of a regulation or statute.  Unlike many state causes 
of action, a property owner is entitled to a jury trial under a § 1983 
claim.190   
Several considerations remain the same, however. Williamson 
County’s “finality” ripeness requirement was not challenged and re-
mains good law.  And, while San Remo Hotel’s “preclusion trap” is gone, 
preclusion remains a concern for property owners who choose to litigate 
a state law takings claims in state court.  Currently, a property owner 
cannot raise a federal takings claim seeking damages against a state gov-
ernment in a federal court (Eleventh Amendment).191  The question 
 
 186. City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997). 
 187. Id. at 2170; see also id. (“The Fifth Amendment right to full compensation arises at 
the time of the taking, regardless of post-taking remedies that may be available to the property 
owner”); id. at 2172 (“A later payment of compensation may remedy the constitutional viola-
tion that occurred at the time of the taking, but that does not mean the violation never took 
place. The violation is the only reason compensation was owed in the first place. A bank 
robber might give the loot back, but he still robbed the bank.”). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 189. Id. at 2176 (“Today, because the federal and nearly all state governments provide just 
compensation remedies to property owners who have suffered a taking, equitable relief is 
generally unavailable.”). 
 190. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710 
(1999). 
 191. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); see, e.g., Williams v. Utah Dep’t of 
Corr., 928 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Knick did not involve Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, which is the basis of our holding in this case. Therefore, we hold that the takings 
claim against the [Utah Department of Corrections] must be dismissed based on Eleventh 
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remains, however, whether just compensation falls within the category 
of “damages” contemplated by the Eleventh Amendment.192  Also, if just 
compensation is not available, could a property owner seek declaratory 
relief against a state actor directly under the Fifth Amendment? 
A federal takings claim against a local government may still fall 
within one of several abstention doctrines.  Under the Pullman doctrine, 
a federal court will abstain from deciding sensitive policy issues that are 
best handled by state courts.193  Under Younger, a federal court will ab-
stain where there are ongoing state proceedings that involve a question 
of state interest and where there is an adequate state remedy.194  Burford 
provides that a federal court must abstain when (1) there are difficult 
questions of state law that will impact questions of substantial public 
import; or (2) where federal review would be disruptive of state efforts 
to establish a coherent policy on matters of substantial public concern.195  
Finally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that a federal district court 
cannot rule on a question of state constitutional or statutory law once the 
highest court of the state has done so.196  The doctrine recognizes that 
only U.S. Supreme Court can review a decision on federal law made by 
a state’s highest court.197 
 
 
Amendment immunity.”); Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 937 F.3d 454, 456 
(5th Cir. 2019) (“Nor does anything in Knick even suggest, let alone require, reconsideration 
of longstanding sovereign immunity principles protecting states from suit in federal court.”). 
 192. An individual may still seek prospective relief against state officers under Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), but may not seek damages. And one may still sue individual 
state actors in their personal capacity. It is unclear, but doubtful, that any of this is changed 
by the Court’s statement in Knick on the unavailability of injunctive relief. 
 193. See generally R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
 194. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 195. See generally Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
 196. See generally Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Ap-
peals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
 197. See generally Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Ap-
peals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
